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STATEMENT OF JANE STROMSETH, PROFESSOR OF LAW,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ms. STROMSETH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
grateful to be here today.
And if I may, I would like to ask your permission to put my
longer statement in the record.
Chairman FEINGOLD. Without objection.
Ms. STROMSETH. Thank you.
Since the horrific attacks of September 11th, we have begun to
mobilize a broad range of tools in a global war against terrorism.
The military components of this campaign are diverse. They include combat operations, continuous air patrols, maritime interception of shipping, the training and equipping of foreign militaries for
combat operations, and assistance to post-conflict peacekeeping,
just to name a few.
This campaign is likely to be long-term, far-reaching, and in contrast to more conventional military operations, it will be much
harder to determine when or if the war is over or what constitutes
victory.
Despite these complexities, and indeed in fact because of them,
I will argue here that the basic principles of our Constitution concerning war powers remain as vital and relevant as ever, indeed
more so, in this war against terrorism.
I will alao argue that Congress' post-September 11 authorization
of force correctly recognized that both Congress and the President
have a vital role to play in this war; that meaningful, high-level
consultations are essential as the campaign unfolds; and that additional congressional authorization may be constitutionally required
in some situations in the future.
Our Constitution's division of war powers between Congress and
the President is part of a structural system of checks and balances
designed to protect liberty by guarding against the concentration of
power. The division of war Fowers was also designed to draw upon
the distinctive attributes 0 both Congress and the President, the
legislature's deliberative qualities and the President's ability to act
with efficiency and dispatch in creating an effective national government capable of protecting and defending the United States.
Mr. Chairman, there is a huge scholarly literature about the
Framers' intent and about the meaning of subsequent historical
practice, and time does not permit me to engage in a comprehensive discussion here. But let me highlight four points from the
record that in my view are essential to understanding the constitutional division of war powers and how they apply to the war on terrorism.
First, the power to declare war vested in Congress was intended
by the Framers to be a power to decide, to make a choice about
whether the United States should go to war. It was not a formalistic power to simply validate that a previous state of war existed. On the contrary, the Constitution gave Congress the power
to decide whether the United States should initiate war because
the founders believed such a significant decision for the country
should not be made by one person alone but rather by the legislature as a whole to ensure careful deliberation by the people's elect-
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ed representatives and broad national support before the country
engaged in such an action.
Second, the founders clearly expected the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief to protect the United States by
repelling attacks, or imminent attacks, against the United States,
its vessels, its forces, and to protect American citizens. Moreover,
they wanted effective, unified military command in a single set of
hands.
However, if an enemy engaged in limited acts, limited attacks
that did not themselves bring us into a full state of war, the Constitution envisioned that that decision would be made by the Congress.
Third, Congress' power of the purse, though critically important,
is not a substitute-fer congressional authorization of war before it
is commenced. Reliance on the power of the purse alone as a check
on executive war powers, moreover, can be overly blunt and sometimes ineffective and counterproductive as a tool for expressing
Congress' will.
Fourth, historical practice has not fundamentally altered how we
should understand the Constitution's allocation of war powers
today. Of the dozen major wars in American history, five were formally declared by Congress and six were authorized by other legislative means.
Now, there is, to be sure, a practice of limited presidential uses
of force that falls short of-major national conflicts. A substantial
number of these, 70 out of the sometimes 200 cases cited br scholars, involve the protection or rescue of U.S. nationals, actions far
short of deliberate war against a foreign state and reasonably falling within the President's authority to respond to sudden attacks.
Other cases went beyond this. But as a general matter, one has
to be very cautious about drawing broad conclusions about presidential war powers from a very disparate set of cases, some of
which were protested by Congress. And so one has to look at the
instances very carefully.
And the fact remains that major wars have been authorized by
Congress.
Well, which side of the line, in any event, does the current global
campaign against terrorism fall? The global war on terrorism in
which we are now engaged aims to destroy a multistate terrorist
network and potentially to defeat or overthrow sponsoring regimes.
The scope and complexity of this global campaign against a terrorist network based in over 60 countries goes beyond any commonsense notion of a limited police action.
Congress, in authorizing the use of force after the September
11th attacks, recognized that the situation we faced implicated the
war powers both of the Congress and of the President. And the authorization, though it has no geographical limits and allows for appropriate executive flexibility, is not a blank check.
The joint resolution authorizes the use of necessary and appropriate force against those responsible for the September 11th attacks or those who harbored those responsible. And the purpose of
using force is focused in the future, oriented to prevent additional
terrorist attacks against the United States by those responsible for
the September 11th attacks.
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Mr. Chairman, let me make two final points, one about consultation and one about the possibility for future authorizations.
In a campaign against terrorism that is likely to be long and farreaching, regular and meaningful consultations between Congress
and the President as envisioned in the War Powers Resolution are
essential to ensure that there is a shared understanding between
Congress and the President on future directions in that war and
broad support for the steps ahead. A commitment by the President
and Cabinet officials to hold regular consultations with the bipartisan leadership, and ideally with the broader group of members as
well, I think would be invaluable.
Moreover, given the complexity of the campaign against terrorism, its open-ended nature, its geographic scope, the enormous
stakes involved, Congress, I think, should request that a broader
range of information be provided in the regular war powers reports
that are submitted pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. I think
the combination of fuller reports, and perhaps seeking high level
testimony when those reports are filed, that combination would, I
think, spur a more significant and effective dialogue between Congress and the administration regarding future goals as this campaign unfolds.
But, as Alton Frye and others have I think properly suggested,
as important as consultations are, they are not a substitute for congressional authorization in those situations where the Constitution
envisions and expects Congress to authorize the choice for war.
As our country moves ahead in the campaign against terrorism,
threats to our security that are not linked to September 11th may
well present themselves. Whether and when additional congressional authorization is constitutionally required will depend on the
facts of the situation and on the nature and magnitude of the military action contemplated.
While the President clearly possesses the power to repel and
forestall attacks, the decision to commence a war belongs to Congress. Mlijor military action with far-reaching objectives, such as
toppling a government, for instance, is the kind of action that constitutionally the founders expected would be debated and authorized by Congress in advance.
And in this connection, I realize Iraq is not the focus here, but
since it was brought up by a previous panelist, let me just say that
absent a connection to the September 11th attacks, which may be
established-we do not know that at this point-but absent that
connection, I do not think that statutory authority currently exists
to go to war against Iraq. The 1991 Gulf War authorization does
not provide a current authorization to commence such a war. And
I think for exactly the reason, Senator, you mentioned: The American people have a sense that these issues have to be debated contemporaneously in light of current circumstances, not relying simply on a resolution adopted over a decade ago in a different set of
circumstances..
The war against terrorism, unfortunately, will be with us for a
long time. However, as our Nation moves ahead 'on various fronts,
using a variety of tools and means, our response will be both more
effective and more sustainable if the Congress and the President
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continue, as they have done 80 far, to work together in the best tradition of our great Constitution.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stromseth follows:]
STATEMENT OF JANE STROMSETH, PROFESSOR OF LA'Y! GEORGETOWN UNNERSITY
LAw CENTER, WASHINGTON, v .C.
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss the important constitutional question of war powers in the context of the war on terrorism.
The September 11th attacks pose unprecedented challenges for our Nation .
We were attacked by a global network that was able to inflict massive casualties
upon innocent civilians and would do so again, possibly with greater effect, if given
the opportunity. Under such circumstances, we have begun to mobilize a broad
range of military, diplomat ic, intelligence, law enforcement, economic, and financial
tools in order to wage this global war on terrorism. This campaign is likely to be
long-term and open-ended, with conflict potentially on multiple fronts; and, in contrast to more conventional operations, it will be much harder to determine when or
if the war is over or what constitutes victory.
Despite these complexities, indeed, in fact because of them, I win argue here that
the basic principles of our Constitution regarding war powers remain as vital and
relevant as ever-indeed even more so-in the fight against global terrorism. I will
also argue that Congress's post-September 11th authorization of force correctly recognized that both Congress and the President have a vital constitutional role to play
in prosecuting the global war on terrorism; that mean ingful high-level consultations
are essential as the campaign aJ:ainst terrorists with global reach and their State
sponsors unfolds: and that additional congressional authorization may be constitutionally required in some situations in the future.
THE CONSTITUTION'S ALWCATION OF WAR POWERS

Our Constitution deliberately divided war powers between the Congress and the
President. In making this choice, the framers sought to create an effective national
government capable of protecting and defending the country while also remaining
accountable to the American people. The Constitution's provisions concerning war
powers-like those concerning other aspects of governance-reflect a structural system of checks and balances designed to protect liberty by guarding against the concentration of power. In a deliberate break with British precedent!.the Constitution
gave Congress the power to declare war because the founders believed such a significant decision should be made not by one person, but by the legislature as a
whole, to ensure careful deliberation by the people's elected representatives and
broad national support before the country embarked on a course so full of risks. Reflecting on this allocat ion of power, James Madison wrote: "In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause which confides the question
of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department."l
At the same time, the framers wanted a strong Executive who could "repel sudden
attacks" and act with efficiency and dispatch in protecting the interests of the
United States in a dangerous world. By making the President Commander in Chief,
moreover, they sought to ensure effective, unified command over U.S. forces and civilian accountability. The Constitution's division of war powers between the President and the Congress has led inevitably to tension between the branches-and to
an enduring tug of war over war powers-even as the participation of both branches
clearly is essential in protecting our country and advancing American interests.
Mr. Chairman, there is a huge scholarly literature about the Framers' intentions
with respect to constitutional war powers and about whether historical practices in
the two centuries since the Constitution was ratified should alter how we should
understand these authorities today. It is impractical for me to offer a detailed and
comprehensive discussion here ,2 but let me instead highlight four propositions from
1 Alexander Hamilton & James Madison Letters of Pacifcus and Helvidius on the Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793, at 89 (James Madison) (Washington, D.C., J . Gideon & G.S. Gideon
1845).
aIn a longer piece I discuss original intent, historical practice, and current arguments about
war powers more fully snd systematically, and I draw on my conclusions in that piece here. See
Continued
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the historical record that, in my estimation, are central for understanding the constitutional roles of Congress and the President today.
First, the power to "declare war" vested in Congress was intended by the Framers
to be a power to decide, to make a choice, about whether the United States should
go to war; it was not a formalistic power to simply validate that ~ leial State of war
existed. On the contrary, Congress was given the power to determine whether the
United States should initiate war in order to ensure that the decision to expose the
country to such risks and sacrifices reflected the deliberation and judgment of the
legislature-the branch most directly representative of the American people, whose
lives and resources will 00 III aced on the line-and to ensure broad national support
for such a course of action. This interpretation is further validated by the Constitution's grant of authority to Congress to authorize reprisals, or acts of limited war,
that could lead to a wider war which clearly indicated a broader understanding of
Congress's war-commencing role than simply a formal declaration that a State of
war existed.
Second, the Chief Executive's authority to repel sudden attacks by force is incontestable. The founders expected the President, as Chief Executive and Commander
in Chief, to protect the United States by repelling actual or imminent attacks
against the United States, its vessels, and its armed forces. Moreover, if another Nation effectively placed the United States in a State of war-by declaring or openly
making war upon the United States-the President as Commander in Chief was expected to exercise the nation's fundamental right of self-defense. However, if an
enemy engaged in limited attacks that did not nse to the level of war, the founders
expected the President to repel those attacks but not to go beyond this authority
and change the State of the Nation from peace to war without congressional authorization.
Third, Congress's power of purse, though critically important, is not a substitute
for congressional authorization of war before it is commenced. The founders understood that the British monarch's power to go to war was qualified to a substantial
degree by the Parliament's power of the purse and its control over military supplies.
In giving Congress the power of the purse, including the power of appropriating
money to "raise and support Armies" and to "provide and maintain a navy," the
Constitution continued this important legislative check. But the Constitution did not
stop here. The Constitution also gave Congress the power to declare war and authorize reprisals, so that congressional deliberation would occur before war was commenced. Reliance on the power of the purse alone as a check on executive war powers, moreover, can be an overly blunt and sometimes ineffective tool for expressing
the will of Congress. Limiting or cutting off funds after forces have already been
committed is problematic because it undercuts both troops in the field and America's
credibility with her allies. Restricting funds in advance is often undesirable as well
because it can harm the President's ability to carry out effective diplomacy. In short,
as important as Congress's power of the purse is, it is not a substitute for Congress's
power to authorize war.
Fourth, historical practice has not fundamentally altered how we should understand the Constitution's allocation of war powers today. Practice, of course, cannot
supplant or override the clear requirements of the Constitution, which #pves the
power to declare war to Congress. Furthermore, of the dozen major wars 10 American history, five were formally declared by Congress and six were authorized by
other legislative measures." There is, to be sure, a pattern of practice involving more
limited Presidential uses of force falling short of major national conflicts, a substantial number of which involved the protection or rescue of U.S. nationals caught up
in harm's way. For example, of the 200 or so cases sometimes cited as examples of
unilateral commitments of force by the President, nearly 70 involved the protection
or rescue of U.S. nationals, actions far short of deliberate war against foreign countries and reasonably covered by the President's authority to respond to sudden
threats. A number of other operations were interventions or peace enforcement actions that aimed at limited goals. Others involved more far-reaching objectives, however, even if the risks were relatively low. In some of these cases, like Haiti, for
instance, Congress protested unilateral actions taken by the President and made
Jane E. Stromseth, "Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters 106 Yale L.J. 845 (1996).
3The five declare wars are the War of 1812' the Mexican-American War of 1848' the SllanishAmerican War of 1898i.JVorld War I; and World War II. The wars authorized by other ler.slative
measures include the Naval War with France (1798-1800); the First Barbary war (180 -1805);
the Second Barbary War (1816); the Civil War; the Vietnam War; and the Persian Gulf War.
The Korean War stands alone as the only ml\ior war not expressly authorized by Congress in
advance.
K
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clear its view that its authorization should have been sought in advance.s My basic
point is this: one must be very cautious in drawing broad conclusions about Presidential power from a numerical list of cases. These instances each have to be examined carefully, and the authority claimed by the President and Congress's reaction
fully aseessed.s Ultimately, however, whatever conclusions one comes to concerning
the constitutional implications of small-scale Presidential actions undertaken without congressional authorization, the fact remains that major wars have been authorized by Congress.
Where exactly does a global war on terrorism fallon the spectrum between major
war and smaller scale military actions? If it were purely a police action against hostile non-state actors, akin to operations against pirates or to other small-scale operations with limited objectives, a case can be made that historical practice indicates
a record of Presidential deployments without advance congressional authorization.
The President, after all, clearly possesses authority to repel and to forestall terrorist
attacks against the United States, its forces, and citizens.
Yet, this global campaign is much more ambitious than apprehending terrorists.
It aims to destroy a multi-state terrorist infrastructure and potentially defeat or
overthrow sponsoring regimes. While military force is not the only, or even indeed
the main, instrument for waging this war, the range of military activities that we
have mounted to date is very diverse-combat operations, continuous air patrols,
maritime interception of shipping, the training and equipping of foreign militaries
for combat operations, operational assistance to poet-conflict stability operations,
just to name a few. Given that the current campaign is focused against a global terrorist network that is based in over sixty countries, that has the capacity to inflict
massive casualties, and that requires or depends upon the sIX nsorship or acquiescence of various countries for its training and safe-harbors, the scope and complexities of this military campaign would appear to defy any commonsense notion of a
limited police action.
11 AUTHORIZATION OF FORCE: SCOPE AND LIMITS
Congress's authorization for the use of force against those responsible for the attacks of September 11 is an express recognition that Congress and the President
both have a critical constitutional role to play in the war on terrorism. Mindful of
the centrality of congressional war powers In a campaign against terrorism that will
be long-term and far-reaching, Congress sought to craft an authorization that both
allowed for appropriate executive flexibility but at the same time is not a blank
check.
Though not restricted geographically, Congress's post-September 11 authorization
does contain some clear limits. The JOInt Resolution authorizes the President:
"to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."
The joint resolution, in essence, authorizes (a) necessary and appropriate force,
against those states, organizations, or persons who (b) planned, authorized, committed, or aided the September 11th attacks, or (c) harbored such organizations or
persons, (d) in order to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons. Thus, the force must be
directed against those responsible In some way for the September 11th attacks, or
those who harbored such organizations or persons; and the purpose of using force
is focused and future-oriented: to prevent additional terrorist acts against the
United States by the states, organizations, or persons responsible for the September
11th attacks or who harbored those responsible. The President determines whether
the necessary link to the September 11th attacks is established, and presumably
Congress expected he would make his determination and the basis for It known to
Congress in some fashion, perhaps through a war ~wers report or through briefings, e.g., to the intelligence committees. Moreover, In signing the Joint Resolution,
CONGRESS'S POST-SEPTEMBER

4 Both Houses of Congress adopted identical resolutions declaring that the President "should
have sought" congressional approval before sending U.S. troops to Haiti and urging "prompt and
orderly withdrawal." S.J. Res. 229, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994). The vote was 91 to 8 in the
Senate, and 258 to 167 in the House.
S For discussion of historical practice see Francis D. Wormuth & Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain
the Dog of War (2d ed. 1989); Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (1995); and Jules Lobel,
"Little Wars" and the Constitution, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 61 (1995).
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President Bush made clear that he would consult closely with Congress as the
United States responds to terrorism.
. Congress' post-September 11th resolution was an unambiguous decision to authorize force. Like the Gulf War authorization in 1991, the authorization explicitly af·
firms that it "is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." This removes any actions
that fall within the scope of the authorization from the War Powers Resolution's 60day time-clock provision. At the same timer Congress made clear that the requirements of the War Powers Resolution otherwise remain applicable.
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

For all the controversy it has spurred, key elements of the War Powers Resolution
are constitutionally compelling and warrant broad support. First, its overriding purpose is to "insure that the collectivejudgment of both the Congress and the President" applies to the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities and to the continued
use of those forces. Second, it seeks to enable Congress to better fulfill its constitutional responsibilities by requiring the President "in every possible instance" to
"consult with Congress before introducing" U.S. armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities and to continue to "consult regularly" with the Congress while
U'S. forces are in those situations. Moreover, the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution makes clear that Congress expected consultations to be meaningful:
"Rejected was the notion that consultation should be synonymous with merely
being informed. Rather, consultation in this provision means that a decision is
pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the
President for their advice and opinions, and in appropriate circumstances, their
approval of action contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful, the President himself must participate and all information relevant to the
situation must be made available." (H'Rep. 93-287 (1993), p. 2351).
Third, under the War Powers Resolution, the President is required to report to
Congress within 48 hours in designated eituations," and to make periodic reports
to Congress at least once every 6 months if U.S. forces remain in hostilities or imminent hostilities.
Whatever conclusions one reaches about the more controversial provisions of the
War Powers Resolution, such as the 60-day time clock," the consultation provisions
are sound and reasonable efforts to ensure that both the President and the Congress
fulfill their constitutional responsibilities concerning the commitment of U.S. forces
abroad. Moreover, even when Congress has authorized the use of force, as it did
after September 11, re~ar, meaningful consultations between Congress and the
President remain vital ill the ongoing war on terrorism. Such consultations are imperative to ensure that there is a frank exchange of views and a shared understanding between Congress and the President on future directions in the war on terrorism and broad support for the steps ahead. To give a counter-example: The experience in Somalia is a cautionary reminder that congressional authorization and
support in the early phases of an operation does not replace the need for continued
dialog about the goals and risks of a changing mission. We cannot afford to make
the same mistakes in the current context.
CONSULTATIONS

How should a system of regular, meaningful consultations between Congress and
the Administration be structured as the country faces up to what will likely be a
long, complex campaign against terrorism? Clearly, a commitment by the President
to liold regular consultations with the bipartisan congressional leadership would be
invaluable. Second, as the War Powers Resolution expressly provides in section 4(b),
Congress should request that a broader range of information be included in the periodic war powers reports provided by the Administration. Those reports, which have
6These include when U.S. forces are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities, "into
the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat," or "in numbers
which substantially enlarlfe" existing deployments of combat-equipped forces in forei~ nations.
7The controversial portions of the War Powers Resolution include section 2c, which I think
does too narrowly stale the President's constitutional war powers, but does not affect the operation of the rest of the resolution, and the 6O-dar time clock provisions, including the concurrent
resolution provision (section 5(b». At the same time, however, the War Powers Resolution explicitly states that it is not intended "to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the
President," 6(dXl), and it also contains a severability clause, which provides that if any provision or application of the resolution is held invalid, the remainder of the resolution shall not
be affected. (Section 9).
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generallr been perfunctory since the War Powers Resolution was first enacted,
should, in the context of the war on terrorism, include a fuller discussion of the objectives and effectivenese of U.S. action, including our efforts to work closely with
allies on multiple fronts. Congress may also wish to request that the reports be
made more f!equently, say every 3 months, and, in any event, invite Cabmet officials to testify on the State of the war on terrorism when those reports are submitted. The combination of fuller reports and high-level testimony could, in eonjunction with meaningful consultations, make for a more significant and effective dialog
between Congress and the Administration regarding future goals and strategies in
the war on terrorism.
FuTuRE AUTHORIZATION
As important as consultations are, however, they are not a substitute for congressional authorization if military action is contemplated that clearly implicates
Congress's war powers. While the post-September 11 authorization is broad, it does
contain limits, most notably the requirement of a clear link to the attacks of September 11. Other threats to U.S. security unrelated to those attacks may exist or
arise in the future, and various military options may be considered, including options that go beyond measures to prevent future acts of terrorism by those responsible for tne September 11th attacks. Whether and when additional congressional
authorization is constitutionally required will depend on the facts of the situation
and on the nature and objectives of the military action contemplated.
Constitutionally, the President clearly possesses the power to repel attacks and
to forestall imminent attacks against the United States and its armed forces and
to protect Americans in imminent danger abroad. But the decision to go beyond this
and commence a war belongs to Congress. Ml\ior military action with far-reaching
objectives such as regime change is precisely the kind of action that constitutionally
should be debated and authorized by Con~ss in advance. The Constitution's "wisdom" on this point is compelling: Authonzation, if provided by _Congress.. ensures
that the risks and implications of any such action have been fully considered and
that a national consensus to proceed exists. Congressional authorization also ensures American combat forces that the country is behind them, and conveys America's resolve and unity to allies 811 well as adversaries.
The war against terrorism wrll, unfortunately, be with us for a long time. However, as our Nation moves ahead on various fronts, using a variety of tools and
means, our response will \Y., more effective and more sustainable if the Congress and
the President continue to work together in the best tradition of our great Constitution.

Chairman FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Professor.

I just want to mention two items here, in light of your testimony.
One is, I was pleased to have you sort of join the point that Dean
Kmiec had raised, which I had not heard before, the idea that de-

claring war is merely to in effect have Congress ratify something
that is already happened. I would submit-and I certainly know
that he has a dean of law, so I am careful to do this-but that if
the Framers had intended that to be the case, thev could have used
words like "ratify" or "endorse" or "acknowledge." To me, "declare"
has always been a strong word suggesting a proactive role for Congress.
But that is an interesting point that I had not thought about before. And as we get into the questions, you can respond to that.
Secondly, some of the testimony seems to merge or maybe even
confuse consultations over broad scope of policy directions versus
consultation over tactical decisionshwhich is a dangerous thing. Because none of us, at least nobody t at I work with here in the Senate, really believes that we should be consulted about every tactical
decision. That is a scary thought, in terms of our armed forces.
And the trouble is, though, as the discussion proceeds, if the goal
for consultation is portrayed as trying to get into all that, it makes
people turn off on the whole idea of legitimate consultation. And
that is something we have to avoid.
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I.

Pnlfeaor Stromscth, In your teatImony, you IDdJcate !hit there it historical
prccCdeot foe!be PresldeDt10 act without ~ aulborizatioo when
pur.NiDgpollee actions. 1111 't die current war 00 temxiIm a poIkc action u well
lIS a military action because die enemy it dispersed throughout die woeld7 Didn't
Congress ac:kDowledge lhis in 5J. Res. 23. authorizing die I'raident to use force
DOt (Wy agalnst nat1oo.s, but penoos and orgsnlzatloosu weU?
-Presidents hl!lOrically hive Used limited foo:e in "pollee" actions In
punult of individuals, Including pIrate. and bandits. both with and sometimes
wilhoIt the authorization of Congress. Tbe Pruldent, moreover, has clear
oocstr'Udooo.l1 anthqrity to repel attacb against the United States, Its forces, and
cltizclls and to fottsta11 imIDJ.Dent attICb. 'The current war 011 tcmxism is a
complmt and lllI1lti·faceted campaJgn Involving a wide nnp ofboth law
enforatmalt aod militaly actions. Some of the military opentiOOllR akinto
small-scale "police" llCtioaI dcsiJDCd to appreheud individual tmoriats. Other
aspectaof the war against trrnlrism go well beyood thiJ IDd, u In Afghanistan,
involve InstaiDed combat openltiOlll against a state that suppol'tcd and h&Ibored
those respoasibll, foe the 8eptmlbCa' II temxist auaeks. 5J, Res.23 recognizes
. that the IIllC agahut lemlrism will1oc1ude a diverse range military Ktions
directed sSainst bolh IlOIHtate and ItItt lICtOrs. The joint resolution authorizes
the Presldientto use necasary and appropriate force against nations, organizations
or- penon1 responsible for the September 11 al1lCkJIn order to "prevent any
future aots of Intenlllional terrorism apinIt die United 5tates by such nations,
organizations oe persons." In enacting5J. Res. 23, Coogreu rcc:ogniud the.
impoltaDIeof its authorization and support in a campaign that is likely to be loog
. and &r'r'eIIching, thaI Isfocuased 011 a global tmoriat necwodtbased in over sixty
coanlrles. andthat will involve miliwy aetiooJ that vlrJ in acope IDd complexity,
includinB military opellItions that go ~ limited"poUoe" actiona to apprehend
Individual tarorists.

or

2.

You $tift; ill you: teslimooy!hal the Preaident bu the powa' to repel aetuaI or
immiDeI:.t .utaclts againstlhe United siatcs.. IfthePrcsJdent rl:JCeived intelll&ence
lnfonnatlall that an altaclt OD the United Stata wu lnuniDeot, would be have the
ability tel Ilrike preemptively In In offeDlive awmer7
The President's coosdtutioaalaulhority to repel attaeb against the United
SlatcI is inoXltestable. This 1oc1udes the powerto repellmmiDcGt attacks against
the Uniud States. Thus, if the President received intelligence information Ibst an
attack 00 the UnitedStstes Wit lmtninem, be ceruinly would have the authority
10 ex~lse the country" right of andclpatory eelf-defense by usinS force to
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prevent and preempt the immiIIalt au.ct. I would not cIwacterizc auclJ •
preemptive let of anticipatory self-defenseqalnst an immIneDt attack u
"offemIve~ In IWurej 1nItead, utiDI oeceaaary and appropriate force pwmptivoly
to foratall and prevent an lmmIlItlllt auacltupon the United States would,In my
view, be a ddemivc aetloa u.ndertakm u an exerclae of tho right of .e1f-defenlO.

3.

Profess« StromIeth,you have argued that the frameta Intended Coagrosa to have
broad powers overtho Initlatioo of boctilitiea that arc not conducted pursuant to a
declaraticn of war. lbJs llJ1UIDeIllls partly based 00 Anic!e I, Sectloo S, ClaUIO
11 of the Constitution, whicll gives COOJ1'C$8 tho power'to "grant Let=a of
Marqueand ReprIsal, ..." Isn't tho Marque and Reprisal C!au1O fundamentally
different because It autborlzesprlvaU perties to engage In bostilitie4?
The Coastitutloo's Marque and RepriaalClause, which gives Coagrcssthe
power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," is Important In understanding
the IICOpC of tho war powers vestedIn Coagreas. Lelten of marque and reprisal
have a long history dating beck to tho 12" or 13" century. OrIg1na1ly, as your

question Indlcates, they were governmental authorizatiOllS permitting private
parties to use force- to settle their own grievancesagainst another state or Its
citizens. By ~I sovereignpermission foe private reprisals, European states
during the 12" to 17 centuries aimed to control private warfareand to satisfy
their citizens' grievances. But by the mid.IS" century, governmental controlover
warfare bad Increased subst&ntlally, and reprisals were generally authorized by
sovereign states to pursue their own claims against othtt states. During !be 18'"
century, letters of marque and reprisalwere used by states as a way to authorize
private forces, and sometimes public forces, to take military action In supportof
state goals. (For an historicalanalysis of marqueand reprisa1, see 1ules Lobel,
Covert War and Coagresaional Authority; H1ddc:n War and ForgottenPower, 134
U.Pa.L. Rev. 1035(19S6». In other words, at tho time of the Constitution's
drafting, letters ofmuque and reprisal were likely understoodas a way for slates
to authorize or commencelimitedhostilities against another state short of
declared war. Eighteenthcentury statemen and treatise-writers on the law of
nations referred to reprisals, In particular, as acts of limited hostilityor "imperfect
war" that interrupted the public tranquilityonly partially and that generally had
theD81TOW objective of r«t.ifylng a specific injustice. The Constitution's
founders understood,however,that state reprisals could andoften did lead to fullfledged or "perfect" war. Thus, theylikely understood Congress's power to grant
letters of marque and rqlrisal u the power to authorize the Inltiatiooof bostilities
such as reprisals abort of declared war - hostilities that could cully escalateand
lead to war. lbJs power is In addition to Congress's clear constitutionalpower to
declare or authoriu war.
4.

ProfessorStromseth. do you feel that historical precedent Is valuable In terms of
defining the war·maklng powers of the President and Congress? What past
Presidential actions provide preocedeotial value and what aetiOOl do not?
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YeI, I do lbInkhJIUdc&lpr1lCdce it vaIuabIe lis UDdent.uldlna the
rapcctige WIt poMn of tbo PreIideDt IIld tbo C<JapM. HJatcrical pnlCtIu
camMlt0'ftIdd0 or ameod the elea prov1Iiou of the CooItilutioa, bat it caD beIp
l:IIum1IIale tboIo apectI of the diviaIoa of WIr powen that lie uocertaiD or opeoeodec1 ADaIyziDJ theprecedeatial sIgniftcaDoe of bittorical prutice it an
extremelyImportIntIDd compIox matter. I've discuAed it It fOIDllleogtb in Jane

StromICd1, "UDlIcnUDdJnI CoaItitutlOGlJ War Powcn Today:Why MedIodoloaY

MaIten... 106 Yale LawJoumaJ 00, 812-386 (1996). Let metry 10SWIUDIrizo
IOIDOkey poinW herein aDlWeriDI your queltion.

In evaluatiDs tho aignificanco of historical prlICtice in c:ooaWulioDal
intetpretadon, I think the approecb.laken by lU1dcePranJd'wt« in hi.
YoungItOWn e::cocu%renoo i•• promIain. ooe if appliedthou.tllfuDyto the war

S1Jut & Tube Co. v. 5bw)ttr,343 U.S. 579, 610-11
(1952) ~,1., CODCWrinJ). Praakfurter'. genenllpptOaCb to hiatorical
pnc:ticewu embncedby the SupremeCourt In 1JIJIfIU & Moorev. RegQ1l. 453
U.S.6S4,686 (1981). It bas lOVenI key compooents:
powell cootext. YoungllQlm

Pint, practice caDDOt "auppIant"• clearconatitutiooal requirement. YOlUIg.rtown,
343 U.S. at 610. The CooJtitudon clearly givesCongress the power10dec~
war, and dNs the Praideot canooc, by virtue of historical pncdce.lpPl'Opriate
thatpower. To argueotbuwiae would be to claim. liseffect. thattbe President
alooeor withcongreuionalacquiescence can ''amend'' the CoostitutioD in
COIl.traventioD of thedocument's explicit amendJneot provisiOQJ. In COIl.trut,
where tbe ooostitutlooal text iJ genuinelyambiguousor &ileal, .. it 11 regarding
iasuea lI1eb the PresideDt'. power as Commander in 01ief to deploy forces abroad
for foreign policy purpoees in peacetime or the))RCiae scope of the President'.
authorityto "repel audden attacks," historical practice can abed Usbt on bow we
abouJd undentand the Pmideot'l COIl.atitutlooal poWU' today.

•

•

•

8ecoDd, PrankfuJta' wrote, the practice mustbe "systematic," "unbroken" IIld
"long-pwsued."Ill. In the war powm context, the requirementof. "systematic"
practice means that ooe ID1IIt differentiate between types of action.: Cases In
which the Preakk:nt bas usedlimi~ force to rescueor protect American citiulls,
for inJtance, cannotbe used to claimexecutive authorityto commit American
fon:es lIDilatenl1y to major bostilities.

Third, the executive practice must be "long pursued to the knowledge of the
Coogreu lUld Dever beforequestioned••••" Ill. Congreu, in other words, must
not only be 00 notice of an executive practice and accompanying claim of
authority to act; Congress alsomustaccept that practiceandclaim of authority.
AsscssinB whether Congress can fa.IrIy be laid to have dooo so,of course, raises
manycomplex and difficult issues of interpretinglegislativeintent, particularlyin

1Mwar powm COIl.text, whieb cutaInly arguesfor caution in rnaklng conclusions
about theaigniflC8l1CC of history.

3
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Ju I diI<:uu men runy In my Yale Law JOW'DIl piece. witb Iapect 10war
powers,oaly two eateaorIa of biItorical pnctioe IeelD 10me lJDIIIlbiBuOUlly 10
meet tho Fnnlfurter ICIDdard cmbncod in Da1Ifn cl Moo". The tint it tho i0oiItIDdInt prealdC'Gdil pI'lICdco of deploying (on:a abrolIdfor forclp poUcy
purpoIeIln peacetimo - depJoymaa !hat do DOtInvolve CXlDIIDeOclnJ boItilidel.
The CoDItitudoa doeI DOt cleady allocate this powec, andIUcoeaive~
pneraUy have accepted or acquie8ced In lhiI executive pnctke ov« !be yem..
ByaccepdDa subltlDtlal preIIdeotla1latitode In making peact(hne llOOp
depIoymeota, coopasea ov« tho years have reoognized tho valueof pretJdential
Jtitcretloo and ftexibility In !be fIWd IDd often dIDg«ous realm of fore:ip affairs.
Yet Congress hal not therebygiven up ita own authority over IUCh llOOp
deploymelltllDdItcanexercisecoocurreot IlItbority. The second categoryof
bJatorIcaJ pncti.ce that mcetI the Pnmkfurter SUIIdard,in my judgmeot,it the
lona-stIDdinB praideDtlal pnlCtice of Uling I1mjted forceto reac:ue AmerIcan
cltiieDI abrotd wboIC livesare in lmmInent dlDgu. Neltberthe COIlItitutloaa1
text DOl' the original debetea clearly Iddresaexecutive autborlty In this CODtexL
The p!Xtice is well eatabJiahed hia1oric&Jy. Conpess, moreover, geoenlly hal
.c:cepted or ~ In JUCb p:otecdve ICtiona involving minimal risk oreitb«
sustained bostllities or esc;a)adoo and hal provided atatutory au!bority fO!' certain
actions that do DOt amount to ICtI of war. In coottast, blatoricalpractice baanot
given the President the IegaJ au!bority to c:ommence war against anotbet QOUIItry,
wbetber the war be largeor small. The Comtltutionclearly vesta that authority in
Congress.

s.

ProfesSOr Stromaeth, you argue that the Coogreas should provide judgment before
combat operations because it is responsible to !be people. However, Isn't the
President, as an electedofficial, respoosive to the people? Aren't the President's
actioos fuItbcr cocstraincd by Congress' powerof tbe purse and the power to
lmpeacb?

Yes, as an elected official who represents all Americans, the ~t is
clearly responsive and IOCOUI1table to the people. Moreover, in exercising his
c:ooaiderable foreign affairs powen be can act with efficiency and dispatch in
protecting tbe United Slates and tho American people. In dividing the war powers
between Congressandthe Prea.ldcot, however, the Coostitulion provides for two
lines of llCCOIlDtabllity before tbe United Slatescommences 01' initiateswar. Tho
President is Commander in Cliof of the anned forces of the United Slates andbas
cleat authorityto repel attacks, to exm:ise thenalion's rights of self4cfensc, and
to cooduct war authorized by Congress. But, as I di,scuss in my statement, the
Constitution veats thepower to dec1are or authorize warin the legislature as a
whole, to ensurecareful deliberatioo by the people'selectedrepresentatives in
Congress and broad nadonalsupport before the United Statescommences a war.
In short, both the Preaideot andthe CoDgreas arc responsible to the people and
each bas valuable attributes that arc important in the constitutional distributioo of
war powers and In the curreotcampaign againstterrorism.

"
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Cstainly CcDgreu', powerof the pune and the power to Impeacb are
Impc:lneot t lemtnts of tbe atrueturallyattm of cbecu and belllOOlS let forth in our
~on. But, u I diIcua in my ttatemem, the Ccmtltutioo in addition gives
to
tbepower to decide wbet.ber dle United States Iboo1d coaunence war.
J..esWative deh"beratioa befca the United Statealnltlatea war serves a number of
Important purpoIe8 In lldditlon to diose lCrVed by Coapess', power of tbepurse.
Moreover, tho powerof the purIO, though extremelyImportant, can be an overly
blunt instrument forexpreaaiDs coogratlooal will and, in some ailUations, can
risk undercuttina U.S. dlp10mlcy and deployments at critical moments. nu,
undencorcs tbe importance aDd VIlueof deUberadoo by both the Congress aDd
thePrealdent beforeU.S. fortes initiate hostilitlea In order to ensurea strong
national COIIIeDSU' for the acdoo undertaken.

eoaarea

6.

Professor Stromseth, does the Presidellt have the power to UlIO force to respond to
a national emergency created by an attaclc 00 the United State.1? Iso't the
PresideDt currently responding to a national emergency, and abouldn't be have
some latitude in his respoose?

Yes, the Presidentclearly hasooostItutionalauthority to use force to
respood to an attack upoo the UnitedStates. The President', constitutionalpower
to repel attacb upon the United States hasbeen clear from the beginning. The
War Powers Resolution, in section 20,likewise recognizes the President's
constitutional powen as Commander In ChIef to respond 10 ", national
emergency created by attack upon the United States•••" The Presidentcurrently Is
responding to the Septembec 11 attaeb upon the United States and, as
Commander In Chief, the PresideDt should have some latitude in his response.
Congress recognized this in crafting SJ.Res.23, which gives latitudeto the
President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those responsible
foe the attacks of september 11 and contains no geographical limits, in
recognitlOtl of the global natureof terrorist networksand the role of organizations
and individualsas well as states. In enacting S.l.Res.23, which the President
welcomed and aigned into law, both branches recognized that the most effective
response to the September 11 attacks upon the UnitedStales Is a unified one in
which both Congress and the Plaldent act together.
7.

Professor Stromseth, would you agree that the laoguage of SJ. Res. 23, which passed the
Senate by a vote of 98·0, places DO time or geograpbic restrictions on the President's
ability to act, provided that he can coonect the object of his military actions with the
te:TOri5t attacks of september II? Does SJ. Res. 23 satisfy the War Powers Resolution
foe any future use of miUtary force?

SJ. Rea. 23 authorizes thePresident "to use alJ necessary and appropriate focce
against those nations, organizations, oe persons be detenn.inea plaoned, authorized,
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oomm1tIIDd. 01' IJcSed tho tarorbt aaacb tbIt.xamd oa SepcaDber II, 2001, 01'
Mrbond lOebCIJM!ufIclnt 01' pencm, ID 0Idclr to pNWIIt my tulare IlCtaof
iDIemaIioDIl trmxIIm epiDIt tho UDltied &aiel by lOebIlIdoaa, orpDIzatioaa 01'
p«'IIlIDI." 1110 IeIOIatJoa CXlIIIlIiDI no JOOIPIllIdc rettrkdou oa lbe Pruideat'l abWty to
ute "an DOC II.by IDd II(lllrOIIdMe fcn::e".,.met die ~ DatIoaI, orpniudoDa, 01' penoaa
be deCamiDeI "pIaDoed, autbcrized, QOfDllliUed, 01' aided" tho September 11temlriIt
IaIIcb, 01' bIIbored IUCb orpoizIdOOI 01' perIOOI. 1110 raoIudoa coataJDa DO tImo
Hmitl,aJlboaabIt doeI iDdIcItethIt tile purpoIO of u.m, fc:ms J. toc:uued andfutureorieDted: to prnem idditioaI1 teaoriIt IlCb . . . . tbe Unhed StIIeI by tbe ItItes.
orpn!U'k'«Mt OI'peneGa I'OIpOOIlbIe for tbe September 11 lItUocb 01' who bIrbored tboIe
rapooIible. In Ibort, SJ. Rea. 23, tbouab brotldill eewnl reepec:b, alto hu HmJu and J.
foc:uaed oa preveIltiDa future IlCtaof temlrism apiDIt the UtIitcd Statea by tboIe
reIpODIiblo for the Septemb« 111tt8Cb.

SJ. Rea. 23 cxpUcltIyIIffirma ~it .... inteoded to con.atltuto apcclfie statutory
authorizadoa within tbe meanIna of IeCtiOIl S(b) of the War Powcn ReaoJutioo." Tb1I
Janaua8e cleerly 1M exprealy ItaIa eoo,n..',lnteot to authorizefon:e, consistent with
ICCtioa 8(aXl) of. tile W. Powcn RetoJutioa. M' rowJt of tbla 1aDguqe, milllit)'
IICt10n thIt falls witbio Ibo ICqlO of SJ. Rea. 23 J. DOtIJQbjec:t to Ibo 6O-day time cloa
cootained in.cc:don S(b) of the War Poweo ReIOlutioo. At !be same time, SJ. Res. 23
alto ltatel that "(n)othlna in tbla reIOlutioo ~ 1Il'Jrequimnent of the W.
Powaa ReIoIutioo.!I Thus !be reportiD,lDd oonsultatioa requirements of Ibo War
Powers ReIolutioo are Itill app1k:able to aetiOlll authorized by SJ. Res. 23. Given the
likely Icope aDd t1JDe-fnme of the war OIl leI'rOrism, regular repoIU and meaningful,
high-level coawltaltiooJ will be important u the campaign against thole ~iblefor
the Septem1;eJ' 11 attaeb coatinuu.
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